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ABSTRACT 
Whistleblowing is an important action for the organization as a form of 
internal control of illegal actions that cause losses. This study aimed to test 
of causality of the personal cost of reporting and status of the wrongdoer on 
whistleblowing intention. This study used a true experimental design 
between subjects 2x2. The subjects of this study were 95 accounting study 
program students. The students acted as the government’s internal auditor. 
The results of this study indicate that whistleblowing intentions will be 
higher in personal cost of reporting and the status of the wrongdoer low 
compared to personal cost of reporting and status of wrongdoer high. A 
whistleblower prefers not to perform whistleblowing when the wrongdoer 
has a higher position and sanctions to be received are severe. 
Keywords: personal cost of reporting, status of wrongdoer, whistleblowing 
intention. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Organizations are currently faced with the threat of fraud that endangers the 
continuity of their businesses, including in public sectors (Seda & Kramer, 
2015). One indication of fraud is the number of public servants who have a 
lifestyle that exceeds their capacity limits (ACFE, 2018). The public sector 
should provide services to the community fairly and without partiality, but 
officers in this sector often compromise their integrity by accepting bribes, 
gratuities or other types of fraud (Seda & Kramer, 2015). Fraud includes 
corruption, asset abuses, and fraudulent financial statements. The most 
common type of fraud in the public sector is corruption with 50% of total 
fraud (ACFE, 2018). 
 
Corruption is a type of fraud committed by taking money or goods 
that are not theirs for personal gain (Kummer, Singh, & Best, 2015). In the 
PERC (Political and Economic Risk Consultancy) ranking, Indonesia ranks 
the second worst in Asia in the category of efficiency of public services 
(KPK, 2018). One of the cases of corruption in the public sector that recently 
happened was the procurement of e-KTP (electronic identification card) in 
2017 which caused state losses of Rp 2.3 trillion and implicated the name of 
the House of Representative chairman, Setya Novanto. A total of 22 
members of the Regional House of Representative of Malang for 2014-2019 
period were also determined by the KPK (Corruption Eradication 
Commission) as the suspects related to bribery amounted of Rp. 5.8 billion 
in September 2018 (Wismabrata, 2018). The KPK revealed that if public 
sector corruption continues to happen, it will result in greater loss suffered 
by the nation, the decreasing level of public trust in the public sector, and 
inefficient public service bureaucracies. 
 
One way to reduce fraud is through a whistleblowing mechanism 
(ACFE, 2018). Whistleblowing is the process of illegal or immoral action 
disclosure by members of the organization to people or organizations that 
can deal with such fraud (Gottschalk, 2011). The determinants of 
whistleblowing include the characteristics of the whistleblower, the 
characteristics of the recipient of the report, the characteristics of the 
wrongdoer, the characteristics of fraud, and the characteristics of the 
organization (Gao & Brink, 2017). The characteristics of the whistleblower 
include characteristics of personality, moral judgments to assess a person’s 
right or wrong behavior, and demographic characteristics, namely age, race, 
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gender, and experience. The characteristics of the report recipient consisting 
of characteristics of the recipient of the report and the characteristics of the 
reporting channel, such as the administration. The third determining factor 
focuses on the strength and credibility of the wrongdoers. The characteristics 
of fraudulence are divided into the organization’s dependence on errors, the 
credibility of the whistleblower’s evidence, and the legality of alleged fraud 
that influences witnesses’ perceptions and whether the report will be handled 
or not. The other determinants include the feasibility of whistleblowing, 
organizational climate, and organizational structure (Gao & Brink, 2017). 
 
The act of whistleblowing is important for an organization, but the 
decision to report fraudulence is not easy to make. The ERC (Ethics 
Resource Center) found that 41% employees were aware of fraud in their 
organization, but 31% chose not to report such actions (ERC, 2013). One of 
the considerations of employees is the sanctions that will be accepted after 
carrying out whistleblowing (Alleyne, Hudaib, & Pike, 2013). This 
employees' view of sanctions refers to the personal cost of reporting. Kaplan, 
Pope, & Samuels (2010) define the personal cost of reporting as an 
employee's view of the risk of sanctions that can reduce their intention to 
report a fraud. Some of these sanctions can be in the form of defamation, 
termination of employment, or other types of discrimination. 
 
In addition to personal cost of reporting, employees’ considerations 
are also affected by the status of employees who commit fraud or referred to 
as fraudulent perpetrator status (Gao, Greenberg, & Wong-On-Wing, 2014). 
Employees with low positions will find it difficult to report fraudulent 
actions by employees with higher positions or ranks. It is because the 
employees with high positions have a power to take revenge on those who 
report their actions. The greater the distance of the perpetrator’ position or 
rank with the fraud reporter, the greater the likelihood that the employee who 
reports  receives revenge (Nickolan, Handajani, & Hermanto, 2018). 
Bjørkelo, Einarsen, Nielsen, and Matthiesen (2011) and Sonnier (2013) state 
that whistleblowing is closely related to the position of the reporting and 
reported employees in the company. 
 
There are several researches regarding whistleblowing, personal cost 
of reporting, and the status of the wrongdoer. Craft (2012)  and Alleyne et al. 
(2013)  found that the personal cost of reporting does not affect the intention 
of employees to be a whistleblower. Morrison (2011), Kaptein (2011), and 
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Cho and Perry (2012) conducted a study of the status of  the wrongdoer and 
obtained results that the status of wrongdoer affected the intention of  a 
whistleblower. Suyatno, Armstrong, & Thomas (2017) found that the status 
of the wrongdoer did not affect the intention of whistleblowing. Nickolan, 
Lilik Handajani and Hermanto (2018) found that the personal cost of 
reporting and the status of the wrongdoer affected the potential for 
whistleblowing in BPK RI. 
 
Studies on the  personal cost of reporting and the status of the 
wrongdoer such as those that were conducted by Kaptein (2011), Cho and 
Perry (2012), Suyatno, Armstrong and Thomas (2017) tend to be done in the 
private sector. Meanwhile, Craft (2012), Alleyne et al. (2013), Morrison 
(2011), Nickolan, Handajani and Hermanto (2018) conducted research in the 
public sector with  internal auditors. Government internal auditors as part of 
the government internal control apparatus have an important role in 
whistleblowing. The Government Regulation No 60 of 2008 of Article 11 
Regarding Government's Internal Control System regulates that the task of 
internal government auditors is to improve the effectiveness of risk 
management and the quality of governance in the functioning of Government 
Agencies. One way to improve the effectiveness of risk management and the 
quality of governance is through whistleblowing (ACFE, 2018). 
 
Law No 28 of 1998 regulates the task of internal government auditors 
is to supervise the implementation of government affairs in the regions for 
the realization of a good and clean governance free from corruption, 
collusion and nepotism practices. Nonetheless, the practices of corruption, 
collusion and nepotism in the public sector continue to occur (Alleyne et al., 
2013). Thus, a research on the intention of whistleblowing on internal 
government auditors who are influenced by the personal cost of reporting 
and the status of the wrongdoer has the potential to be investigated. 
 
This study aimed to examine the causal relationship between the 
personal cost of reporting and the status of the wrongdoer towards the 
intention of whistleblowing in the public sector, so that relationships among 
variables have high internal validities. This study is expected to be able to 
contribute to the knowledgebase and understanding of audits, especially the 
system of whistleblowing in the public sector to reduce fraud. 
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LITERATURE STUDY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Research Scope 
 
Fraud conditions in this study are described in the context of 
manipulation of official travel reports carried out by the heads or accounting 
staff of an organization. To reveal fraud in government organizations there is 
a mechanism for whistleblowing that is influenced by several factors, namely 
the personal cost of reporting and the status of the wrongdoer. The personal 
cost of reporting is the received sanction after a whistleblower performs 
whistleblowing. This study defines the two types of personal cost of 
reporting, namely personal cost of high and low reporting. Personal cost of 
high reporting is described by disrespectful termination of employment. 
Personal cost of low reporting is described by sanction of reprimand. The 
status of the wrongdoer is also divided into two categories, namely the status 
of a high and a low wrongdoer. The position as the head of a health office 
becomes a form of high wrongdoer status. Conversely, the position as an 
accounting staff is a form of low wrongdoer status. The decision to be a 
whistleblower is obtained after accepting the condition of a high/low 
personal cost and high/low wrongdoer status. 
 
Theory of Planned Behavior 
 
The Theory of Planned Behavior reveals that a person’s behavior is 
driven by the intention to behave. This theory is related to whistleblowing 
because intention has an important role in determining the act of 
whistleblowing (Alleyne et al., 2013). The greater the intention of someone 
to take action, the greater is the possibility of that intention being actualized 
in the form of an action. Therefore, intention will be a factor in predicting the 
act of someone’s whistleblowing. An organization that is intended to design 
an effective whistleblowing system needs to understand the various factors 
that can affect its employee’s intention to be a whistleblower (Ajzen, 2011a). 
 
Whistleblowing 
 
Disclosure of disgrace is defined as disclosure by a member of an 
organization concerning illegal or immoral actions to his fellow members of 
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an  organization or to an organization that can make improvements over 
those fraud (Gottschalk, 2011). Whistleblowing is an important action 
carried out by every organization as a form of internal control of any illegal 
action that cause losses. When we use the term whistleblowing, we are 
talking about reporting on misconduct by individuals or companies that take 
advantage of the government or cause some public harm. Whistleblowing in 
an organization can increase security from the threat of fraud committed by 
members of the organization (Gottschalk, 2011). Whistleblowing is a method 
of uncovering fraud that is more effective than other methods (Kummer et 
al., 2015). 
 
There are two types of whistleblowing, internal and external 
whistleblowing. Internal whistleblowing is individual who reports suspected 
misconduct up the chain of command at the subject’s workplace. This can 
involve going to an audit department, a compliance officer, a supervisor, in-
house legal counsel or even an internal hot line. External whistleblowing 
refers to an individual who observes misconduct by an entity or individual, 
generally an employer, customer, supplier or competitor. Then, they report 
that misconduct to an outsider, generally a private attorney. Whistleblowers 
might report directly to a government agency or prosecutor or utilize a public 
hotline designed for reporting fraud or abuse by companies. 
 
The fraudulent reporter in an organization is called a whistleblower. 
The whistleblower comes from the internal organization. An employee who 
knows the importance of the whistleblowing towards his organization is 
faced with an ethical dilemma as to whether to report the known fraud or to 
allow such fraud to remain hidden (Suyatno, Armstrong, & Thomas, 2017). 
Good corporate governance is the hope of every organization. However, this 
expectation is sometimes constrained by human resources who do not have 
good integrity. Often organizational cheating practices are known by 
employees at the bottom first. There are several causes of fraud that are not 
revealed, namely because they are not formally regulated. To create good 
governance, a whistleblowing system is needed (Morrison, 2011). This 
system can reduce the risk of an organization's reputation. Reporting through 
whistleblowing is also useful for improvement so that similar fraud does not 
recur. In addition, it can improve the culture of business ethics. The 
whistleblowing system compared to other reporting systems will provide 
convenience and a sense of security for the reporter. 
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To reduce this dilemma, the government has issued a law to protect a 
whistleblower, namely the Republic of Indonesia Law No. 31 of 2014 
concerning the protection of witnesses and victims. 
 
Personal Cost of Reporting 
 
One of the factors that influences one’s intention to be a 
whistleblower is the personal cost of reporting. The personal cost of 
reporting is explained as the employees’ views on the risk of sanctions that 
he/she will receive when  the fraud is reported (Kaplan et al., 2010). 
Perception of an increasingly high personal cost of reporting can reduce the 
intention of employees to report any fraud. Sanctions received by those 
employees may include: postponement in promotion, defamation, 
elimination of additional income, termination of employment, and other 
forms of discrimination (Kaplan et al., 2010). A higher personal cost of 
reporting will reduce the intention to perform whistleblowing (Nickolan, 
Lilik Handajani, & Hermanto, 2018). The personal cost of reporting of 
members of public sector organizations in Indonesia may include reprimand, 
demotion, or even disrespectful dismissal (DJPP, 2010). 
 
Status of Wrongdoer 
 
Another factor that influences a person's intention to be a 
whistleblower in addition to the personal cost of reporting is the status of 
wrongdoer. The status of the wrongdoer is the status of an employee who 
commits fraud (Nickolan, Lilik Handajani, & Hermanto, 2018). The status or 
level of power of the wrongdoer influences one’s intention to be a 
whistleblower (Gao, Greenberg, & Wong-On-Wing, 2014). ACFE (2018) 
found that 70% of the wrongdoing in the public sector occurs at the 
executive or managerial  level. The acts of fraud committed by members of 
an organization with high status will be more difficult to be reported 
members with a low status in an organization. The high status member of an 
organization through his high position has the power or authority to retaliate 
against those who report his fraud. This means that the greater the distance 
between the position and fraudulence, the greater the likelihood of retaliation 
will be received by the whistleblower (Nickolan, Handajani, & Hermanto, 
2018) 
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The Relationship between Personal Cost of Reporting and Intention of 
Whistleblowing 
 
One of the considerations for a member of an organization in 
carrying out whistleblowing is the sanctions that could be accepted. 
Sanctions may come from management, employer, or even coworkers. Taras, 
Kirkman, & Steel (2010) state that sanction includes measures to undermine 
the process of whistleblowing, exclusion, character assassination, exceptions 
at meetings, or other disruptions. Nickolan, Lilik Handajani and Hermanto 
(2018) said that the greater  the risk, the greater possibility for someone to 
conceal what they actually know. 
 
Craft (2012) and Alleyne et al. (2013) found that the personal cost of 
reporting did not affect the intention of external auditors in whistleblowing. 
It is because an audit practitioner must be professional and independent. This 
professional and independent attitude will increase management trust and not 
interfere with the level of objectivity of the produced reports. Unlike Craft 
(2013) and Alleyne et al. (2013), Nickolan, Handajani and Hermanto (2018) 
also conducted a study on personal cost of reporting toward Indonesian 
government auditors and showed that the personal cost of reporting affected 
the intention to perform whistleblowing. 
 
The attitude in the theory of planned behavior is explained as a 
person's actions based on consideration of gains and losses that he can obtain 
(Ajzen, 2011a). The intention of someone to take action will be higher when 
he feels that he will get benefits from his action. A whistleblower, including 
members of public sector organizations also tend to consider the advantages 
and disadvantages obtained when carrying out whistleblowing. The 
Government Regulation No. 53 of 2010 concerning Civil Servants Discipline 
regulates the personal costs of members of public sector organizations in 
Indonesia. The low personal cost of reporting that can be received by 
members of public sector organizations are reprimands, postponement of a 
one year salary and position, or demotion for one year. The high personal 
cost of reporting is demotion for three years or even disrespectful dismissal. 
If a sanction to be received by a whistleblower is high, it will reduce his 
intention to be a whistleblower. Thus, the first hypothesis is formulated as 
follows: 
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H1: Subject with a condition of high personal cost of reporting 
will have a lower intention to be a whistleblower than a 
subject with a condition of low personal cost of reporting. 
 
Relationship between Status of Wrongdoer and Intention of 
Whistleblowing 
 
Fragale, Overbeck, and Neale (2011) stated that one's status is only as 
much as others give. The status of a wrongdoer is the position or authority of 
the wrongdoer. The status of the wrongdoer is one of the considerations for a 
whistleblower. The wrongdoer who has a high position will be difficult to be 
reported. This is caused by the consequences obtained when revealing the 
fraud of those with a higher authority (Nickolan, Handajani and Hermanto, 
2018). Morrison (2011) conducted a survey of the public sector and found 
that members of organizations that had low positions often received 
improper treatment. Kaptein (2011), Cho and Perry (2012), and Nickolan, 
Handajani and Hermanto (2018) also said that a high-status wrongdoer 
would be difficult to be reported. However, Suyatno, Armstrong, & Thomas 
(2017) found that the position of fraudulent perpetrator did not affect the 
intention of whistleblowing. 
 
A whistleblower will consider the position of a wrongdoer. The 
organizational structure that places the Regional Inspectorate under the 
Regional Head and administratively under the Regional Secretary allows a 
higher rate of retaliation when the fraud is reported. One category in the 
theory of planned behavior is the control of behavior which postulates that a 
person’s actions depends on the ease or difficulty that they will encounter 
(Ajzen, 2011a). If the position of the wrongdoer is higher, then it is 
increasingly difficult for a whistleblower to uncover a fraud. In addition, it 
will be easier for a wrongdoer to take revenge on the whistleblower. It will 
reduce the whistleblower's intention to be a whistleblower. Therefore, the 
second hypothesis is proposed as follows: 
 
H2: Subjects with a high wrongdoer status will have a lower 
intention to be a whistleblower than subjects with a low 
wrongdoer status. 
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Personal Cost of Reporting, Status of Wrongdoer and Intention of 
Whistleblowing 
 
The research results of Nickolan, Handajani and Hermanto (2018) 
show that the personal cost of reporting affects the intention of 
whistleblowing of civil servants. Morrison (2011), Kaptein (2011), Cho and 
Perry (2012) also conducted research on the status of a wrongdoer against 
the intention of whistleblowing. The research results indicated that the higher 
the position of the wrongdoer, the more the organization will depend on him. 
It causes the wrongdoer to act arbitrarily and the potential for retaliation is 
great for the informant of fraud. 
 
Nickolan, Handajani and Hermanto (2018) conducted a study on the 
effect of the personal cost of reporting and the status of wrongdoer on 
Indonesian government auditors. The results of the study revealed that the 
personal cost of reporting and the status of the wrongdoer did affect one’s 
intention to perform whistleblowing. A whistleblower will prefer not to 
perform whistleblowing when he knows that the wrongdoer has an 
authoritive position far above him. He will choose to remain silent for he 
knows that he could receive very harsh sanctions. 
 
Retaliation is an important component in the personal cost of 
reporting. Based on the theory of planned behavior, one’s actions are based 
on the consideration of advantages or disadvantages and potential easiness or 
difficulty that could be faced (Ajzen, 2011a). A whistleblower who reports 
fraudulent actions committed by a wrongdoer with a high authority will meet 
severe sanctions. Thus, the higher the status of the wrongdoer, the higher the 
personal cost of reporting received by the informant and it will reduce the 
intention to perform whistleblowing. Based on previous arguments the third 
hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H3: Subjects with a condition of a high personal cost of reporting 
and status of wrongdoer will have a lower intention to 
perform whistleblowing than subjects with a low personal 
cost of reporting and status of wrongdoer. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
 
This study used a quantitative method in the form of laboratory 
experiments. This study examined the presence of whistleblowing intention 
in the condition of high personal cost of reporting and status of wrongdoer. 
The study used data from students who have taken audit courses. The 
dependent variable in this study was the intention of whistleblowing and the 
independent variable was the personal cost of reporting and status of 
wrongdoer. 
 
The experimental method was chosen because it has high internal 
validity in testing the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. In addition, the experimental method is able to control other 
variables outside the relationship. This study used the factorial 2 × 2 design. 
The first factor is the condition of the personal cost of reporting consisting of 
two levels, namely subjects with the condition of a high personal cost of 
reporting and subjects with the condition of a low personal cost of reporting. 
The second factor is the condition of the wrongdoer’s status consisting of 
two levels, namely subjects with conditions of a high wrongdoer status and 
subjects with a condition of low wrongdoer status. 
 
Table 1: Experimental Matrix 
 Status of Wrongdoer 
High Low 
Personal Cost of Reporting 
High Cell 1 Cell 2 
Low Cell 3 Cell 4 
 
Information: 
Cell 1: Condition of high personal cost of reporting and high status of 
wrongdoer. 
Cell 2: Condition of high personal cost of reporting and low status of 
wrongdoer 
Cell 3: Condition of low personal cost of reporting and high status of 
wrongdoer. 
Cell 4: Condition of low personal cost of reporting and low status of 
wrongdoer. 
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Personal cost of reporting is the employee’s view of the risk of 
sanctions that might be received after he/she reports a fraud (Kaplan, Pope, 
& Samuels, 2010). Status of wrongdoer is the status of an employee who 
commits a fraud (Nickolan, Handajani, & Hermanto, 2018). The stages in 
this study are in the form of preparation of four experimental modules, where 
each module shows if the subject is in the condition of a high personal cost 
of reporting; the subject is in a condition of low personal cost of reporting; 
the subject is in the high status of wrongdoer; and the subject is in the 
condition of a low status of wrongdoer. The condition of high personal cost 
of reporting is a condition when the sanction suffered by a whistleblower is 
in the form of severe sanctions, namely disrespectful termination of 
employment. The low personal cost of reporting occurs when a 
whistleblower gets a minor sanction after performing whistleblowing, 
namely only gets a reprimand. The high status of the wrongdoer shows a 
high authority position of the wrongdoer indicated by the position of head of 
department. The low status of the wrongdoer is indicated by the low position 
of the wrongdoer, namely the accounting staff. 
 
The steps that were carried out in this analysis were: 
1. Presenting a descriptive statistical analysis of the experimental 
results. 
2. Conducting a test of effectiveness of randomization using the one-
way ANOVA.  
The test of effectiveness of randomization is done to test if the 
characteristics of the subjects influence decision making. 
Randomization is said to be effective if the dependent variable of 
whistleblowing is not influenced by the independent variable, i.e. the 
demographic characteristics of the subjects. The test of effectiveness 
of randomization was accepted if the significance level of all 
demographic characteristics is greater than α = 5%. 
3. Performing a manipulation check. Manipulation check is done by 
determining the subjects’ answer score for the questions given. 
4. Performing a test of hypothesis with an average difference test 
(independent t-test) for the first and second hypotheses, and the two-
way ANOVA for the third hypothesis. Two way ANOVA and the 
independent t-test are accepted if the significance level is less than α 
= 5%. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
General Description of Subjects 
 
The subjects of this study were students of an accounting study 
program who had taken an auditing course. The subjects came from the 
Universitas Widya Mandala Surabaya (51 subjects) and Universitas Atma 
Jaya Yogyakarta (47 subjects). Students were used as subjects because they 
do not require basic experience and knowledge in this experimental method. 
Those who took part in the simulation were 98 students. However, after 
performing a manipulation check, the subjects who passed the manipulation 
amounted to 95. In this simulation, the subject acted as the government’s 
internal auditor. Table 2 shows the characteristics of the subjects involved in 
the study. 
 
Table 2. Demographic Characteristics of Subjects 
Demography Characteristics Number of Subject Percentage (%) 
Gender Male 22 23,16 
 Female 73 76,84 
Grade Point Average 
(GPA) 
≤ 3 20 21,05 
 3 – 3,5 39 41,06 
 ≥ 3,5 36 37,89 
Semester 6 90 94,74 
 8 5 5,26 
 
Table 2 shows that the majority of subjects who participated in the 
simulation were female with a total of 73 students (76.84%) and the majority 
GPA was in the range of 3-3.5 (41.06%). The average subjects who followed 
the audit simulation were in semester 6 and only 5 students (5.26%) were in 
semester 8. 
 
Manipulation Check 
 
The manipulation check was done by giving the subjects three 
questions about their current condition based on the module. If the subjects 
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answered at least two questions correctly, it was concluded that they passed 
the manipulation. The analysis results of manipulation checks showed that 
out of 98 subjects, 3 subjects (3.06%) did not pass the manipulation check, 
while the subjects who passed were 95 students (96.94%). 
 
Randomization Test 
 
Before testing the hypotheses, a test of randomization needs to be 
firstly done. Randomization test aims to determine whether demographic 
factors influence the subjects’ decision making. A randomization test was 
carried out by testing demographic factors on the subjects’ characteristics on 
judgment by using the one way ANOVA. Randomization was accepted if the 
dependent variable was the intention to perform whistleblowing was not 
influenced by demographic characteristics. 
 
Table 3: Results of Test of Randomization Effectiveness 
 F-Statistics Sig. 
Gender 0,722 0,633 
Grade Point Average (GPA) 1,050 0,399 
Semester 1,794 0,109 
General Knowledge 0,809 0,565 
 
The results of the randomization test in this study indicated that there 
was no influence between the decisions to perform whistleblowing with the 
subjects’ demographic characteristics. Table 3 shows that all the levels of 
significance of demographic characteristics were more than 0.05 (0.633; 
0.399; 0.109; 0.565). This means that the three demographic indicators 
which include gender, grade point average, semester, and general knowledge 
did not affect the decision to perform whistleblowing. Therefore, the results 
of randomization test are said to be effective because demographic factors do 
not affect the subjects’ decision and that only the manipulation treatment 
affects the subjects' decision. 
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Test of Hypotheses 
 
Test of hypothesis 1 
 
Hypothesis 1 in this study postulated that subjects with a condition of 
high personal cost of reporting will have a lower intention to perform 
whistleblowing than subjects with a condition of low personal cost of 
reporting. Hypothesis 1 test was done using the independent sample t-test. 
 
Table 4: Results of Hypothesis Test 1 
 
Mean Std. Deviation T 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
High Personal Cost of Reporting 79,78 16,718 -4,038 0,000 
Low Personal Cost of Reporting 91,20 10,428   
 
Statistics test shows significant results that there is a difference in 
intention of whistleblowing between subjects in a condition of high and low 
personal cost of reporting at a α = 5% significance level of (sig 0,000 < 
0,05). This difference also proves that the subjects’ intention to perform 
whistleblowing on a condition of high personal cost of reporting will be 
lower than the subjects on a condition of low personal cost of reporting. The 
average result of high personal cost of reporting was at 79.78 while on low 
personal cost of reporting was at 91.20. This shows that subjects who were in 
a condition of low personal cost of reporting tended to have a higher 
fraudulent intention than subjects who received a condition of high personal 
cost of reporting. 
 
This result is in accordance with the theory of planned behavior 
which states that the sanction to be accepted is one of considerations for 
carrying out whistleblowing. People’s intention to take action is weaker 
when they feel that they will get a disadvantage from their action. One who 
is encountered with a condition of obtaining only a reprimand, will make a 
decision to do whistleblowing. On the contrary, when one encounters a 
possible severe sanction tends to choose to stay silent. 
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The results of this study are in line with the research of Nickolan, 
Lilik Handajani and Hermanto (2018) who conducted a study on  the  
personal cost of reporting toward auditors of the Indonesian government and 
found that the personal cost of reporting influenced the intention to perform 
whistleblowing. Personal cost of reporting can be in the form of reprimand, 
demotion, or even disrespectful dismissal. However, this result is different 
from the research of (Craft, 2012) and Alleyne et al. (2013) who found that  
the personal cost of reporting did not affect an auditor’s intention to perform 
whistleblowing. The reason is that practitioners of auditing must be 
professional and independent. 
 
Test of hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 2 in this study postulated that subjects with a high status 
of wrongdoer will have a lower intention to perform whistleblowing than 
subjects with a low status of wrongdoer. Similar to hypothesis 1, hypothesis 
2 also used the independent sample t-test. Table 5 shows the results of 
hypothesis 2 testing. 
 
Table 5: Test Results of Hypothesis 2 
 
Mean Std. Deviation T 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
High Status of Wrongdoer 79,57 13,825 -3,418 0,001 
Low Status of Wrongdoer 88,75 12,312   
 
The results of statistical test as in Table 5 show that there are 
differences in the intention of whistleblowing between subjects with a high 
wrongdoer status condition and subjects with a low status of wrongdoer at 
the α = 5% significance level (sig 0.001 < 0.05). The intention of subjects to 
perform whistleblowing is lower when they deal with the condition of a high 
status of wrongdoer than subjects in the condition of a low status of 
wrongdoer. This can be seen through the results of the average score of a 
high wrongdoer status which amounted to 79.57 while the subjects in the 
condition of a low wrongdoer status amounted to 88.75. This shows that 
subjects who encountered the condition of a low status of wrongdoer tend to 
have higher fraudulent intention than subjects who encountered a condition 
of a high status of wrongdoer. 
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One of categories in the theory of planned behavior is the control of 
behavior which states that a person’s actions depend on the easiness or 
difficulty that they will encounter (Ajzen, 2011). The authoritative position 
of the wrongdoer has become a consideration for a whistleblower in 
performing whistleblowing. If the position of the wrongdoer is higher, it is 
increasingly difficult for a whistleblower to disclose fraud. The higher the 
position of the wrongdoer, the easier it is to find out who reported a fraud. 
The organizational structure that places the Regional Inspectorate under the 
Regional Head and technically under the Regional Secretary allows a higher 
level of retaliation risk when someone reports a fraud. It will reduce the 
whistleblower’s intention to perform whistleblowing. 
 
These results are in line with the research of Morrison (2011), 
Kaptein (2011), Cho & Perry (2012), and Nickolan, Lilik Handajani and 
Hermanto (2018) who stated that the high status of the wrongdoer will make 
it difficult for those in a lower position because they will receive undue 
treatment. Organizations tend to depend and protect employees with high 
positions. The results of this study are different from the research of 
Suyatno, Armstrong and Thomas (2017) who found that the position of a 
wrongdoer did not affect the intention of whistleblowing. 
 
Test of hypothesis 3 
 
Hypothesis 3 in this study postulated that subjects with the condition 
of a high personal cost of reporting and a high status of wrongdoer will have 
a low intention of whistleblowing compared to subjects with the condition of 
a low personal cost of reporting and a low status of wrongdoer. Test of 
hypothesis 3 was done by the two-way ANOVA test. 
 
Table 6: Test Results of Hypothesis 3 
Tests of Between - Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable : Intention of Whistleblowing 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 2119,474 3 706,491 3,171 0,028 
Intercept 629538,309 1 629538,309 2825,365 0,000 
Status of Wrongdoer 533,558 1 533,558 2,395 0,125 
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Personal Cost of Reporting 308,754 1 308,754 1,386 0,242 
Status of Wrongdoer * 
Personal Cost of Reporting 
1153,385 1 1153,385 5,176 0,025 
Error 20276,315 91 222,817   
Total 657900,000 95    
Corrected Total 22395,789 94    
 
The statistical test in Table 6 shows a significance level 0.025 or 
lower than 0.05. This shows that the third hypothesis in this study is 
supported. Table 7 shows that the group average scores in the condition of a 
low personal cost of reporting and a low status of wrongdoer have an 
average value of 89.2308. This value is greater than value in the condition of 
a high personal cost of reporting and a high status of wrongdoer which is 
only equal to 80.8696. Based on these data, it can be concluded that the 
intention of someone’s whistleblowing will be higher when he is in a low 
personal cost of reporting and a low status of wrongdoer condition compared 
to a high condition of personal cost of reporting and a high status of 
wrongdoer. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Hypothesis 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: Intention of Whistleblowing  
Status of 
Wrongdoer 
Personal Cost 
of Reporting 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
High High 80,8696 15,34839 23 
 Low 77,5000 14,21879 24 
 Total 79,1489 14,71908 47 
Low High 78,6364 18,33432 22 
 Low 89,2308 11,63549 26 
 Total 84,3750 15,83240 48 
Total Tinggi 79,7778 16,71810 45 
 Low 83,6000 14,10746 50 
 Total 81,7895 15,43545 95 
 
The results show that the personal cost of reporting and the status of 
the wrongdoer have an effect on one’s intention to perform whistleblowing. 
Based on the theory of planned behavior, one's actions are based on 
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consideration of advantages or disadvantages and easiness or difficulty that 
will be faced (Ajzen, 2011). A whistleblower prefers not to perform 
whistleblowing when the wrongdoer has a higher position and sanctions to 
be received are severe. Retaliation is a component of the personal cost of 
reporting. A whistleblower who reports fraudulent action committed by a 
wrongdoer with a higher authority will face increasingly severe sanctions. 
Therefore, the higher the status of the wrongdoer, the higher the personal 
cost of reporting which will be received by the informant and will reduce his 
intention to perform whistleblowing. 
 
The research of Nickolan, Handajani and Hermanto (2018) examined 
the effect of personal cost of reporting and status of the wrongdoer towards  
Indonesian government auditors support the results of this study. Employees 
who have a high position will find it easier to find out who reports the fraud.  
Being in this authoritative position, will make it easier to retaliate on the 
whistleblower. 
 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, AND LIMITATIONS 
 
Conclusion 
 
The results of this study show that the personal cost of reporting and 
the status of wrongdoer affect the intention to perform whistleblowing. 
Someone in a high personal cost of reporting tends to have a low intention to 
perform whistleblowing compared to someone in a low condition of personal 
cost of reporting. The high status of the wrongdoer will make it difficult to 
be reported compared to the low status of wrongdoer, which will reduce the 
intention of whistleblowing. In addition, the interaction between the personal 
cost of reporting and the status of the wrongdoer has a significant effect on 
the intention to perform whistleblowing. Someone’s intention for 
whistleblowing will be higher when he is in a low condition of personal cost 
of reporting and low status of wrongdoer compared to a high condition of 
personal cost of reporting and a high status of wrongdoer. 
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Implications 
 
Knowledge implications 
 
Through this paper, auditors of public organizations can become 
aware of matters relating to whistleblowing intentions. Factors that may 
increase or reduce someone's whistleblowing intention are made known. 
Thus, auditors are able to minimize fraud through increased whistlebowing. 
 
Theoretical implications 
 
The theoretical implication of this study is that it provides evidence 
that if the personal cost of reporting is related to the status of wrongdoer, it 
can affect the intention of whistleblowing. This study contributes to the 
development of behavioral research in examining the personal cost of 
reporting and status of the wrongdoer. 
 
Practical implications 
 
This study calls for organizations to pay more attention on the 
mechanism of whistleblowing. This can be done by implementing a 
whistleblowing system that makes it easy for the reporting process, protects 
the security of fraudulent informants, and imposes no sanctions against 
whistleblowers. Thus, fraud in organizations can be reduced by 
implementing such a system. 
 
Limitations and Suggestions 
 
The limitation of this study lies in the number of subjects. There were 
more than 50 subjects in a single room at the time of filling out of the 
modules. This causes the filling out of modules to be difficult to control. For 
further research, it is proposed that researchers pay more attention to the 
number of subjects in a single room, having about 25 subjects will make it 
easy to control filling of the modules. In addition, future research may 
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consider individual characteristics such as Machiavelli and organizational 
climate. 
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